Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Title VII - Sex Discrimination - Pregnancy - Defenses by Cohen, Margaret L.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 20 Number 1 Article 12 
1981 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Title VII - Sex Discrimination - Pregnancy 
- Defenses 
Margaret L. Cohen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Margaret L. Cohen, Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Title VII - Sex Discrimination - Pregnancy - Defenses, 20 Duq. 
L. Rev. 123 (1981). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol20/iss1/12 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-TITLE VII-SEx DISCRIMINATION-
PREGNANCY-DEFENSES-The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has held that an airline's employment
policy mandating immediate unpaid maternity leave for all flight
attendants upon discovery of pregnancy is sex discrimination but
is justified by safety considerations.
Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th
Cir. 1980).
In 1977, Ute Harriss and Margaret Feather instituted a class
action suit charging their employer, Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. (Pan Am), with sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII, sections 703 (a)(1) and (2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
The plaintiffs challenged Pan Am's policies mandating immediate
unpaid maternity, leave for all flight attendants upon discovery
of pregnancy (Stop Policy), prohibiting their return to work until
at least sixty days after giving birth (Start Policy), denying them
accrual of seniority after the first ninety days of leave, and
refusing them sick leave benefits during the leave.2 Pan Am's
Stop Policy requires a pregnant flight attendant to notify her
supervisor immediately upon discovery of pregnancy. Failure to
do so constitutes voluntary resignation from Pan Am. 3 Pan Am's
Start Policy requires that the flight attendant remain on unpaid
leave until sixty days after delivery, and it further requires that
1. Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 414 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), aff'd as corrected, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980). See 42 U.S.C §
2000e-2(a)(1) & (2) (1976) which provide:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id.
2. 437 F. Supp. at 414.
3. Id. at 415-16.
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she return to work within ninety days after giving birth.4 At the
time this litigation was initiated a flight attendant on pregnancy
leave accrued no seniority beyond the first ninety days of leave
and lost sick pay and some medical insurance coverage. Like
medical and emergency leave, Pan Am classified pregnancy leave
as a nondiscretionary leave. An employee on medical leave,
however, receiving full sick leave benefits, accrued seniority for
a maximum of three years.'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California,6 in denying the plaintiffs' requests for injunctive relief
or damages, held that Pan Am's Stop and Start Policies con-
stituted prima facie sex discrimination because their result was
to disproportionately exclude women from employment tem-
porarily.' The district court found, however, that Pan Am had
not violated Title VII because safety considerations -the risk
that a pregnant or post-partum flight attendant would unpredict-
ably suffer complications during an emergency landing 8-justified
these policies as a business necessity and bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ).9 The district court held that neither the
seniority policy nor the sick leave policy constituted prima facie
sex discrimination. 10
4. Id. The leave could be extended from 60 to 90 days upon request, and
further reasonable extensions would be granted for medical reasons. Id at 416.
5. Id at 416-17. An employee taking a discretionary leave, which may be
granted for personal reasons, accrued seniority for only the first 90 days away
from work. Id.
6. The district court determined that the plaintiffs' action could be main-
tained as a class action on behalf of "all female flight attendants who have been
employed as such by [Pan Am] after October 24, 1972, or who may be so
employed . . . in the future." Id. at 414 (quoting Harriss v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1977)).
7. 437 F. Supp. at 431.
8. Id. at 420-24, 434-35. The district court found that the possibility of
spontaneous abortions and disabling nausea or fatigue was unpredictable.
Therefore, pregnant flight attendants ran the risk of becoming incapacitated
during flight and, more importantly, when called upon to participate in
emergency evacuations. Moreover, Pan Am offered evidence to show that the
risk of post-partum hemorrhaging cannot be assessed without a medical ex-
amination. Two of Pan Am's witnesses maintained that an accurate examination
could not be performed until six weeks after delivery. Id. at 424.
9. Id. at 434.
10. Id. at 436-37. The district court relied on General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), where the United States Supreme Court held that
the exclusion of pregnancy-related disability from an employer's otherwise com-
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Harriss and Feather appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,1' which held that the Stop Policy
constituted prima facie sex discrimination, but was justified by
safety considerations. 2 The Start Policy was also found to be
prima facie discriminatory; however, the circuit court remanded
this issue because the district court's findings of fact were insuf-
ficient to determine whether the Start Policy was justified.1" The
court of appeals found Pan Am's seniority policy to be prima
facie discriminatory, and remanded for a determination of
whether the policy was nonetheless justified as a business
necessity or BFOQ.'4 In 1978, between the time of the district
court decision and the appeal, Congress passed an amendment to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which explicitly categorized distinc-
tions based on pregnancy as sex discrimination. 5 Because the
plaintiffs sought back pay as well as injunctive relief, the court
of appeals considered the legality of Pan Am's policies both prior
to and subsequent to the amendment.16
The court noted that the plaintiff initially has the burden of
establishing a prima facie Title VII violation by showing that the
challenged practice is discriminatory on its face or has a sexually
discriminatory impact. 7 Prior to the 1978 amendment, Pan Am's
policies were not discriminatory on their face, and therefore, to
prehensive disability insurance plan was not sex discrimination, but merely a
refusal to confer a benefit which men also could not obtain. Id. at 138-39.
11. Harriss v. Pam Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's holdings on the Stop, Start, and
Seniority Policies. They did not challenge the court's holding on sick leave
benefits. Id. at 672.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 672-73.
15. The amendment added subsection (k) to section 701 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or in-
ability to work . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978).
16. 649 F.2d at 673.
17. Id See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); deLaurier v. San
Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978).
1981
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establish prima facie sex discrimination, the plaintiffs must show
that the polices had a discriminatory impact on women. 8 After
such a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
employer to justify these policies. 9 The business necessity
defense is a judicially developed defense to a finding of prima
facie discrimination where an employment policy, though not
facially or intentionally discriminatory, has an adverse and
disproportionate impact on members of a protected group.'
The court noted that the business necessity defense 2' requires
a showing that the challenged practice, although having a
discriminatory impact on women, is nonetheless necessary to
safe and efficient job performance.' In order to meet this re-
quirement, there must exist a business purpose sufficiently com-
pelling to override the discriminatory impact; the challenged
policy must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged
to serve; and there must be no acceptable alternatives available
which would better accomplish the business purpose or do so
with a less discriminatory impact.23 If the employer is able to
meet the burden of showing a business necessity, the plaintiffs
may then show that alternative practices which do not have a
discriminatory effect are available and feasible.
18. The Supreme Court in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977),
established that pregnancy classifications which had a discriminatory impact on
women constituted prima facie violations of Title VII. In Satty the Court held
that an employer's practice of requiring pregnant employees to take a formal
leave of absence, during which the employees forfeited any seniority which had
accrued before the leave commenced, was not merely a refusal to extend to
women a benefit that men also could not obtain, as in Gilbert, see note 10
supra, but the imposition on women of a substantial burden that men need not
suffer. 434 U.S. at 141-42.
19. 649 F.2d at 673. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)
(educational testing requirements held prima facie race discrimination because
they operated to disproportionately exclude blacks).
20. 649 F.2d at 674 & n.2.
21. The court stated that its most thorough consideration of the business
necessity defense arose in Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 926 (1980) (height requifement and physical
abilities test for entry level police positions prima facie discrimination because of
disproportionate impact on women). 649 F.2d at 674-75.
22. 649 F.2d at 675 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14
(1977)).
23. 649 F.2d at 675 (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
24. 649 F.2d at 673. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978).
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After the 1978 amendment, classifications based on pregnancy
are facially discriminatory." Consequently, plaintiffs are not re-
quired to make a showing of discriminatory impact. In causes of
action accruing after 1978, employers have the burden of justify-
ing any classification based on pregnancy as a BFOQ.1 Unlike
the business necessity defense, the BFOQ is provided for by
statute."
In order to justify facial discrimination in terms of the BFOQ
defense,"8 the Harriss court held that job qualifications that an
employer invokes to justify his discrimination must be reason-
ably necessary to the essence of his business.' The court main-
tained that the BFOQ defense placed the burden of proof on the
employer to show that all or substantially all women cannot safe-
ly and efficiently perform the job duties involved."0 If, however,
such a showing cannot be made, a reasonable general rule can be
justified by showing that it is impossible or impractical to deal
with women on an individualized basis.3
25. 649 F.2d at 676 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978)). See note
15 supra.
26. 649 F.2d at 676.
27. Id at 674 n.2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) which provides in pertinent
part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter .... it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees ... on the basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise ....
Id
28. The court adopted the BFOQ standard developed by the fifth circuit in
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (bus company
policy of refusing applicants between the ages of 40 years and 65 years for ini-
tial employment as intercity bus driver upheld as BFOQ). 649 F.2d at 676. In
formulating the BFOQ standard, the Tamiami court drew upon Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)
(BFOQ must be reasonably necessary to the normal operation of employer's
business; being female is not a BFOQ for job of flight attendant, and employer's
refusal to hire males on basis of sex constituted violation of Civil Rights Act of
1964); and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969)
(BFOQ defense based on generalizations about women's physical abilities re-
jected; employer must prove factual basis for believing all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform duties safely and efficiently).
29. 649 F.2d at 676 (quoting 531 F.2d at 236).
30. 649 F.2d at 676 (quoting 408 F.2d at 235).
31. 649 F.2d at 676 (citing 408 F.2d at 235 n.5).
1981
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Applying these standards to Pan Am's policies, the court first
examined the pre-amendment legality of the Stop Policy. The
court concluded that the Stop Policy was gender neutral on its
face,3 but disparately impacted women by excluding a dispropor-
tionate number of them from employment temporarily.' The
court observed that to establish the legality of its Stop Policy
prior to 1978, Pan Am must therefore show that the Policy was a
business necessity.34 Applying the criteria of the business
necessity defense,35 the court held that passenger safety was a
sufficiently compelling business purpose. 3' The court also noted
that the district court had found that individual appraisal of the
abilities of pregnant flight attendants was impractical37 and that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish the existence of feasible
alternatives having a less discriminatory impact.3 According to
the court, these findings were not clearly erroneous. 9
The court recognized that the district court had not made
specific findings on the effectiveness of Pan Am's Stop Policy in
furthering passenger safety. Therefore, the district court had
not established the criterion that the challenged practice effec-
tively carry out the business purpose it allegedly serves."
32. 649 F.2d at 673. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)
(exclusion of pregnancy-related disability from disability insurance coverage is
not facial sex discrimination).
33. 649 F.2d at 673. The court cited its decision in deLaurier v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978), where the court found that
mandatory maternity leave for school teachers has a discriminatory impact on
women. 649 F.2d at 673. The deLaurier court stated that mandatory leave does
not withhold a potential benefit as in Gilbert, see note 10 supra, but rather is a
restriction on women's employment opportunities. 649 F.2d at 673-74 (quoting
588 F.2d at 684-85).
34. 649 F.2d at 674. Before examining Pan Am's justification for its Stop
Policy, the court observed that the district court had incorrectly treated the
business necessity and BFOQ defenses interchangeably. The court of appeals
clarified the distinction, noting that the BFOQ defense applies to business prac-
tices which purposely discriminate on the basis of sex, and the business necessi-
ty defense applies to facially neutral practices which have a disparate impact.
Id
35. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
36. 649 F.2d at 675.
37. Id. (quoting 437 F. Supp. at 434).
38. 649 F.2d at 675 (quoting 437 F. Supp. at 434).
39. 649 F.2d at 675.
40. Id. The district court had found that incapacitation was more likely to
occur during an emergency evacuation if the flight attendant were pregnant
Vol. 20:123
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However, reasoning that the requirement of effectiveness is not
independent of the requirement that the purpose be compelling,
the court of appeals stated that the requisite degree of effec-
tiveness will depend on the gravity of the safety hazard posed
by a flight attendant's becoming incapacitated during an
emergency." Again the court maintained that the district court
findings were not clearly erroneous" and concluded that Pan Am
had satisfied the narrow business necessity defense standard by
adequately proving the correlation between the Stop Policy and
passenger safety.43
Because all pregnancy classifications are per se sexually dis-
criminatory after the 1978 amendment, the court evaluated Pan
Am's post-amendment justification for the Stop Policy in terms
of the BFOQ defense."
Applying the requirements for a BFOQ defense45 to Pan Am's
Stop Policy, the court noted that the district court had
acknowledged that passenger safety is the essence of Pan Am's
business.46 Moreover, the court assented to the district court's in-
terpretation of the Stop Policy as a reasonable general rule and
to its concurrent finding that it is impractical to deal with preg-
nant flight attendants individually." However, the court
than if she were not, because of possible disabling complications. Id (citing 437
F. Supp. at 423). However, in concluding that the Stop Policy was reasonably
calculated to further the safety objective, the district court required only that
the practice be reasonable in light of safety considerations; it did not require a
showing of actual effectiveness in furthering passenger safety. 649 F.2d at 675
(citing 437 F. Supp. at 434).
41. 649 F.2d at 675.
42. Id The district court had found that each flight attendant's ability to
perform is vital in an emergency situation; that a flight attendant's ability to
peform during an emergency may be impaired during the first two trimesters
by fatigue, nausea and vomiting, or spontaneous abortion; and that the gravity
of the safety risk, measured by the liklihood of harm and the probable severity
of harm, was great enough to warrant the imposition of a stringent personnel
policy for flight attendants. Id See 437 F. Supp. at 435.
43. 649 F.2d at 676.
44. Id
45. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
46. 649 F.2d at 676.
47. Id at 676-77. The court cited Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1480 (1981), to support the
district court's finding that the Stop Policy was a reasonable general rule. 649
F.2d at 677. In Burwell the trial court concluded that there was an acceptable
alternative to mandatory pregnancy leave because of testimony from medical
1981
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disagreed with the district court's requirement that the policy
need only be reasonable in light of the safety factor. The court
stated that the correct standard requires that the policy be
reasonably necessary in light of Pan Am's strict safety obliga-
tions to the public, otherwise the BFOQ defense, which the
United States Supreme Court had characterized as an extremely
narrow exception to the prohibition on sex discrimination,48
would be unnecessarily broadened.49 Nevertheless, the court
found the requisite necessity in the significance of the safety risk
involved in allowing pregnant flight attendants to remain on the
job and held the Stop Policy to be reasonably necessary to
passenger safety, and nonpregnancy a bona fide occupational
qualification."
The court next examined the pre-amendment legality of Pan
Am's Start Policy. Because the Start Policy had a discriminatory
impact on women, it was a prima facie violation of Title VII, and
Pan Am had the burden of showing that it was justified as a
business necessity.51 The court noted that there was medical
testimony at trial that prior to six weeks following delivery,
uterine size and body functions are not normal enough to permit
post-partum examinations and thus all women risk disability.
However, the district court failed to determine the gravity of the
risk to passenger safety which would result if flight attendants
were allowed to return to work prior to sixty days after
childbirth, and did not find that the Start Policy was necessary
in light of that risk.2 The issue of the pre-amendment legality of
the Start Policy was therefore remanded to determine whether
Pan Am had shown the policy to be a business necessity.'
Because the district court findings were also insufficient to
determine whether the policy was justified as a BFOQ, the court
experts that abnormal health problems connected with pregnancy could usually
be identified prior to an attendant commencing a specific flight. 633 F.2d at 367
n.6. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held the medical testimony not sufficiently specific to assist in preventing
the one catastrophe that might occur during flight. Id
48. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
49. 649 F.2d at 677.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id.
53. Id at 678.
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of appeals also remanded the issue of the post-amendment legali-
ty of the Start Policy. 4
Turning to the issue of the pre-amendment legality of Pan
Am's seniority policy, the court of appeals observed the district
court's conclusion that the seniority policy was not prima facie
discriminatory.5 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the
seniority policy adversely affected pregnant women beyond the
term of their pregnancy leave5" by lowering their position on the
seniority roster for the remainder of their employment with Pan
Am.57 Therefore, the court found Pan Am's seniority policy to be
prima facie sex discrimination. Because the district court did not
address whether the seniority policy was justified as a business
necessity, the court remanded for a determination of whether, on
the record, Pan Am had carried its burden of proving the
necessity of the policy.'
After the 1978 amendment, Pan Am's seniority policy was
facially discriminatory. The issue of the policy's post-amendment
legality was similarly remanded for a determination of whether
Pan Am had successfully justified it as a BFOQ. 9
Speaking in dissent, Judge Schroeder pointed out that the ma-
54. Id.
55. Id. The district court relied on the Supreme Court's holdings in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), in determining that Pan Am's seniority policy was
not prima facie discriminatory. See notes 10 & 18 supra. In a Supplemental
Memorandum Opinion, the district court reasoned that, unlike the policy
challenged in Satty, see note 18 supra, Pan Am's policy does not deprive preg-
nant women of accumulated seniority, but merely precludes them from ac-
cumulating additional seniority beyond the first 90 days of maternity leave.
Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 881, 883 (1977). The court
concluded that this is more akin to the denial of a benefit, as in Gilber see
note 10 supra, than to the imposition of a substantial burden. 441 F. Supp. at
883.
56. The court quoted with approval Justice Stevens' position in Satty that
a distinction between an employment policy that discriminates against pregnant
women and one that does not can be made by determining whether the policy
adversely affects the woman beyond the term of her pregnancy leave. 649 F.2d
at 678-79 (quoting 434 U.S. at 155 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
57. 649 F.2d at 679. As a consequence of Pan Am's policies, plaintiffs
Feather and Harriss lost approximately 130 days seniority. This could result in
a loss of 20 to 40 positions on the seniority roster. Id. (citing 437 F. Supp. at
417).
58. 649 F.2d at 679.
59. Id.
1981
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jority failed to address why pregnancy should be treated dif-
ferently from other physical conditions: flight attendants with
other physical conditions are permitted to fly upon a visual in-
spection determining that, from appearances only, they are not
incapacitated.' The dissent agreed with the majority's conclusion
that Pan Am's policies were prima facie violations of Title VII,
but diagreed with their holding that the policies were or could
be justified."
Judge Schroeder maintained that Pan Am's justification of its
Stop Policy as a passenger safety measure is flawed by its
assumption that those who replace the grounded pregnant
stewardesses will be better able to perform their duties.2 He
concluded that there was no evidence that replacing pregnant
flight attendants with others whose physical conditions are
unknown or unmonitored, will promote passenger safety. 3
Judge Schroeder asserted that according to the leading
employment discrimination cases, a business necessity or BFOQ
defense requires, at a minimum, a showing that the challenged
policy has a valid purpose and that the policy accomplishes that
purpose. 4 There must also be some factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all of those who cannot perform the job
are within the class excluded. He pointed out that Pan Am had
claimed passenger safety as the purpose of the challenged
60. 649 F.2d at 679 (Schroeder, J., -dissenting). This visual inspection is
made by persons with no medical training. Id.
61. Id.
62. 649 F.2d at 680 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Pan Am had argued that
because of a risk of miscarriage or other disability due to pregnancy, during an
emergency, passengers will be safer if pregnant flight attendants are not per-
mitted to work. Id.
63. Id. Pan Am makes no attempt to prevent flight attendants with other
potentially disabling conditions from flying. It presented no evidence that per-
sons with, e.g., ulcers, hernias, colitis, high blood pressure or heart disease will
be less likely than pregnant flight attendants to suffer incapacitation during
flight. Moreover, Pan Am has no procedure for ascertaining the existence of
these other potentially disabling conditions, and persons suffering them need
not report their condition. No company policy excludes these persons from in-
flight service. Id.
64. Id. (citing Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th
Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969)).
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policies, but had not demonstrated that the policies served that
purpose."
Moreover, if Pan Am's passenger safety justification is to ac-
cord with the judicially developed Title VII requirement that
employment policies must measure the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract," the company should, Judge
Schroeder maintained, design procedures which will directly test
the ability of all flight attendants with medical conditions which
might affect job performance in an emergency." He noted that
the 1978 pregnancy amendment to Title VII and the interpretive
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines
require that persons with similar ability or inability to work be
treated equally."
Judge Schroeder maintained that Pan Am also had not ar-
ticulated any business requirements which justified its Start
Policy. Consequently, he found it impossible to -determine
whether the policy was either sufficiently compelling . or
reasonably necessary. 9 He stated that there is nothing in the
65. 649 F;2d at 680 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
66. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977); Griggs v.- Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
67. 649 F.2d at 680 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
68. Id. Judge Schroeder quoted from the EEOC's position on the effects of
the 1978 amendment, published in question and answer form in the. Code of
Federal Regulations:
6. Q. What procedures may an employer use to determine whether to
place on leave as unable to work a pregnant employee who claims she is
able to work or deny leave to a pregnant employee who claims that she is
disabled from work?
A. An employer may not single out pregnancy-related conditions for
special procedures for determining an employee's ability to work.
However, an employer may use any procedure used to- determine the
ability of all employees to work .... [If an employer, allows its employees
to obtain doctor's statements from their personal physicians for absences
due to other disabilities or return dates from other disabilities, it must ac-
cept doctor's statements from personal physicians for absences and return
dates connected with pregnancy-related disabilities.
649 F.2d at 680-81 n.1 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app.,
at 927 (1980)).
69. 649 F.2d at 681 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).. The record.showed no fac-
tual basis, he maintained, for finding that women are unable to perform their
duties prior to the time set by the Start Policy. Nor had Pan Am shown that in-
dividual medical determinations of fitness for duty are impossible or imprac-
tical. Judge Schroeder believed that the failure to make such a showing should
in and of itself invalidate the Start Policy. Id. (citing-Blake v..City of Los
1981
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record that warrants a remand to the district court because the
Start Policy is wholly unjustifiable. 0
Judge Schroeder pointed out that a seniority policy that treats
pregnant flight attendants less favorably than those with other
medical disabilities has specifically been found to violate Title
VII.71 He believed that the majority correctly found Pan Am's
seniority policy to be prima facie discriminatory, but because
Pan Am had not offered any evidence that supported the policy
as a business necessity, a remand would be pointless."2 Judge
Schroeder concluded that the case should be reversed and the
district court required to issue an injunction against further en-
forcement of the policies and to consider appropriate damages.3
The protection afforded women against employment discrimina-
tion is broader under Title VII than under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment," and is more easily invoked."
Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980)). See
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). He also
noted that the EEOC's position is that an employer cannot have a rule pro-
hibiting an employee from returning to work for a predetermined length of
time after childbirth. 649 F.2d at 681 n.2 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1604 app., at 927 (1980)).
70. 649 F.2d at 681 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (citing Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1480 (1981)).
72. 649 F.2d at 682 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Judge Schroeder further
acknowledged that because of the 1978 amendment, the Civil Rights Act now
requires that women affected by pregnancy be treated the same as other per-
sons not so affected for all employment-related purposes, including the receipt
of fringe benefits. 649 F.2d at 681-82 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978)). Pan Am had already conceded that it may not
enforce the seniority policy under the new law and has since permitted full
seniority accrual during pregnancy leave. The dissent therefore concluded that
the majority not only ignored the language of the statute, but remanded the
question when there is nothing further for the district court to do. 649 F.2d at
682 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
73. Id
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
75. See generally Erickson, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Ap-
proach, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Erickson]; Note,
Covert Sex Discrimination: Evidentiary Burdens Under Title VII and Section
1983 Compared, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1747 (1980). See also Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis the Supreme Court held that a Title VII challenge
to facially neutral employment practices that have a racially discriminatory im-
pact calls for a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, employer
decisions than is appropriate under the constitution. Id at 246-48.
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In Griggs v. Duke Power Co."6 the Supreme Court held that Title
VII aims at eradicating inequitable employment practices which
arbitrarily limit individual opportunities by effectively
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.7 At issue, the Court held, are the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation for their adop-
tion."8 If an employment practice or policy, though neutral on its
face, works to disproportionately exclude members of a pro-
tected class, the practice is unlawful unless the employer can
justify it as a business necessity. 9 In order to trigger judicial
scrutiny of a governmental action with a similar effect under the
equal protection clause, however, a purpose to discriminate must
be shown."0
Since Griggs first articulated the business necessity defense,
courts and commentators have been divided on how narrow or
how broad the defense is, and on how the burdens of proof and
production are to be allocated. 1 The narrowest interpretation of
the defense was formulated in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,82
which held that to defend against a showing of prima facie
76. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
77. Id. at 431. In Griggs the requirement of a high school diploma or pass-
ing a standardized intelligence test as a condition of employment was found to
be a violation of Title VII, because both requirements operated to disqualify
blacks at a substantially higher rate than whites and neither was shown to be
significantly related to successful job performance. Id. at 426, 431.
78. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
79. Id at 431.
80. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). In Davis, the re-
quirement that applicants for employment as police officers pass a written per-
sonnel test, neutral on its face and used generally throughout the federal ser-
vice, did not constitute that invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
equal protection clause, although blacks were shown to be disproportionately
excluded from employment as a result; proof of intent to discriminate is essen-
tial. Id at 246-48. Discriminatory purpose will be found when either the statute
or policy explicitly classifies along racial, sexual, religious or ethnic lines, or the
burdens imposed by its facially neutral classification fall disproportionately on
members of a protected class and the proffered justification is found to be a
pretext for discrimination. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20
(1973); Erickson, supra note 75, at 86-88.
81. Compare Nelson & Ward, Burdens of Proof Under Employment
Discrimination Legislation, 6 J. OF C. & U. L. 301 (1980) with Note, Business
Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative
Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974). See generally Chrisner v. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1266 n.5 (1981) (Keith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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discrimination,, the employer had to show an overriding
legitimate business .purpose for -the -challenged practice. The
business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any
discriminatory impact; the -practice must effectively carry out
the business purpose it. is alleged. to serve; and there must be
available no acceptable. alternative policy which would better ac-
complish the business purpose,-or accomplish it equally as well
with a less discriminatory impact.' Subsequently, the Supreme
Court in Albemarle Paper C6. v. MQbdy84 applied a less stringent
standard, lightening the burden on the employer. Albemarle held
that the employer must demonstrate only a significant correla-
tion between the qualifying traits and job-related abilities which
contribute to safe and efficient job performance.85 If an employer
carries this burden, the complaining party may then show the
availability of equally effective, less-discriminatory alternatives
as evidence of a pretext- for discrimination."
In Furnco Construction C~rp. v. Waters87 the Court further
broadened the defense, holding that the employer need only
show that his hiring procedures -are reasonably related to the
achievement of some legitimate -purpose.88 Title VII, the Court
held, does not impose a duty on employers to adopt a hiring pro-
cedure that maximizes the number of minority employees;89
courts may not step -in and restructure business practices to ad-
82. . 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. disinissed,404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (departmental
seniority system perpetuating effects of-past company practices of overt racial
discrimination in hiring held insufficiently 'justified by proffered business
reasons of being in accordance with -industry practice, avoidance of union
pressure, maintenance of efficiency, economy, and morale).
83. Id at 798 (emphasis added).
84. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
85. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 425.
87. 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (company practice of hiring only those bricklayers
whom the job superintendant knew were- experienced and competent or who
had been recommended to him as similarly skilled held justified as conducive to
the safe and efficient operation of the business, despite its disproportionate ex-
clusion of blacks, and notwithstanding ,the availability of less discriminatory
alternative hiring practices fashioned and imposed by court of appeals below).
88. 438 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added). Cf. New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (broad showing of job-relatedness sufficient to
establish business necessity of excluding methadone users from all transit
authority service).
89. 440 U.S. at 577-78.
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vance minority representation if no violation.of Title VII has
been shown."
Title VII expressly prohibits employment practices and
policies that classify persons interms of their race, sex, religion
or national origin." Because women are to- be considered on the
basis of individual ability, employment- opportunities must not be
denied on the basis of characteristics generally attributed to the
female sex.92 The BFOQ, however, is an express statutory excep-
tion to this prohibition.93
In apparent contradiction with'. Title VII's main objective, a
successful BFOQ defense allows an employment policy to rely on
generalizations about women.' The Supreme Court in Dothard v.
Rawlinson95 found the exclusion of women from contact positions
in Alabama's all-male maximum security penitentiaries to be a
BFOQ on the grounds that, under the very special conditions ex-
isting in the prisons,9" a female guard's very womanhood would
endanger prison security.97 . The exceedingly narrow BFOQ
90. Id. at 578.
91. See note 1 supra.
92. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th
Cir. 1969); Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii)
(1980); Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of, the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1170 (1971).
93. See note 27 supra. An employer can defend against a finding of inten-
tional discrimination only when the discrimination is based on sex, religion or
national origin. There is no statutory defense to intentional racial discrimina-
tion. Id.
94. See Sirota, Sex Discrimination.. Title VII and. the Bona Fide Occupa-
tional Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1048 (1977). But see City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702. 708 (1978) ("Even a
true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an
individual to whom the generalization does not apply").
95. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
96. The conditions in state prisons were characterized by "rampant
violence" and a "jungle atmosphere" which were :constitutionally intolerable. Id.
at 334 (quoting Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd, 559
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977)). Inadequate staff and facilities precluded classification
and segregation of inmates according to their offenses or level of
dangerousness; prisoners who were sex offenders were scattered throughout
the prison's dormitory facilities. 433 U.S. at 335.
97. Id. at 336. Justice Marshall,'concurring in part and dissenting in part,
argued that the BFOQ exception, applied in connection with the normal opera-
tion of a business, cannot be made to depend on'the existence of constitutional-
ly intolerable conditions. Given the :existing conditions in the penitentiary,
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defense thus focuses on characteristics demonstrably inherent in
class membership. These inherently sex-linked traits, however,
must be essential to the job at issue and the job itself must be
essential to the employer's business. 8
As a constitutional issue, the Supreme Court has not treated preg-
nancy classifications as being based on sex," despite its historical
pronouncements on the unique role and destiny of women.' In
Justice Marshall maintained that there was no evidence in the record to sug-
gest that women guards would create any danger to security significantly
greater than that which already existed in Alabama prisons. Id at 342 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority's contention
that the employee's very womanhood disqualifies her, is based, Justice Marshall
maintained, on the stereotypical myth that women are seductive sexual objects
and thus will generate sexual assaults. I& at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
98. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1971) (sex discrimination permissible only when the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively;
customer preference for flight service by women did not justify the exclusion of
males from flight attendant positions). The only acceptable sex-based BFOQ pro-
vided for in the EEOC guidelines is one based on a need for authenticity or gen-
uineness, e.g., for an actor or actress. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1980). A BFOQ
might be asserted where sexuality is part of the product or service, as in, e.g., a
single-sex dating or escort service or a tavern featuring topless waitresses. The
defense would apply, however, only to the extent that this product is essential
to the total business enterprise. 22 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 197, 202-03 (1978).
99. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Court
struck down a school board's mandatory maternity leave policy on due process
rather than equal protection grounds. The policy was found to penalize a female
teacher for asserting her right to bear children. Id at 650. In Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the equal protection issue was squarely addressed in
a challenge to California's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its
otherwise comprehensive disability insurance program. The Court stated that
-pregnancy classifications were not per se classifications based on sex, nor were
they a pretext for discrimination; for although only women can become preg-
nant, pregnancy is an objectively identifiable condition having unique
characteristics by which it can be reasonably distinguished from all other
physically disabling conditions. Id. at 496-97 n.20. See text accompanying note
122 infra.
100. Consider: "[A woman's] physical structure and a proper discharge of
her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the
well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well
as the passion of man." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding
Oregon statute limiting number of hours women were permitted to work in
laundries). "The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the no-
ble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 442, 446 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)
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General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,"°' the Court adopted an equal
protection analysis of sex discrimination and applied it to a Title
VII challenge to General Electric's practice of excluding pregnan-
cy benefits from its otherwise comprehensive disability
program."' Because it believed the program merely denied
women a benefit that men also could not receive, the Court
found no sex discrimination and thus no violation of Title VII.' 3
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 4 the Court recognized that an
employment policy that classified on the basis of pregnancy
might constitute prima facie discrimination if it imposed substan-
tial burdens on women that men need not suffer.15 Because of
the uncertain benefit and burden distinctions drawn in Gilbert
and Satty, and the recognition that discrimination based on
pregnancy is often at the root of practices that keep women in
low paying and dead-end jobs,"'0 Congress passed the 1978
amendment 7 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The amendment
defines pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination,' 8 and
sets standards that require that pregnant workers be treated
the same as other employees-on the basis of their ability or in-
ability to work."°
The Harriss court, in testing the pre-amendment legality of
Pan Am's Stop Policy,"0 expressly applied the most restrictive
standard of business necessity, the "sufficiently compelling" test
formulated in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp."' In applying the
standard, however, the court broadened it significantly. The
(upholding denial by the Supreme Court of Illinois of admission of women to the
practice of law).
101. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
102. Id. at 132-33 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
103. 429 U.S. at 136. See note 10 supra.
104. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
105. Id. at 142. See note 18 supra.
106. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4749, 4751 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
107. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978)).
108. See note 15 supra.
109. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 106, at 4751.
110. Pan Am's justification for its Start Policy was not fully considered by
the court, and its justification for the Seniority Policy was not considered at all.
649 F.2d at 677-79. See text accompanying fiotes 51-59 supra.
111. 649 F.2d at 675. See text accompanying notes 82 & 83 supra.
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court recognized that passenger safety is a compelling business
purpose,"2 but this compelling business purpose can override the
Stop Policy's discriminatory impact, according to Lorillard, only
if the purpose is in fact effectively advanced by the policy."3 Yet
the Harriss court explicitly acknowledged that Pan Am had not
shown -its Stop Policy to be effective in promoting passenger
safety."14 The court found Pan Am's Stop Policy to be a business
necessity by applying a greatly weakened standard, according to
which the importance of the business purpose -here the physical
safety 'of airline passengers-mitigates the need for a factual
showing of the policy's effectivenss in advancing that purpose."5
The court relied on'Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.,"6 to hold
that the degree -to which an employer must demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of, a -policy depends on the safety hazard involved."7
The -Spurlock court, stressed that courts should proceed with
great caution before requiring an employer to lower his employ-
ment standards where the economic and human risks in hiring an
unqualified applicant were very substantial."8 But Spurlock did
not suggest that a court abdicate its role as fact finder in testing
the job-relatedness of pre-employment requirements shown to
impact disproportionately on members of a protected class."9
112. 649 F.2d at 675.
113. Seie 444 F*2d' at 798;'text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
114. 649 F.2d at 675. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
115. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
116., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973) (upholding pre-employment requirements
of 500 hours flying time and a college degree for the position of commercial
pilot, despite disproportionate exclusion of black applicants).
117.' Id. at.219. See also Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center, 558
F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978) (lighter burden on
employer to establish effectiveness of policy requiring college degree for blood
bank technicians);, Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Mo.
1976), affl'd, 568 F.2d 50 (1977) (lighter: burden on employer to establish effec-
tiveness of policy requiring minimum height for pilots).
118. 475F.2d at 219. According to the Spurlock court, the job of airline pilot
is indeed highly skilled, and the lives of many persons are directly and constant-
ly dependent upon these skills. The requirement of a college degree, as in-
dicating the ability to absorb technical training, and the requirment of 500
hours flight service, as indicating greater skill born of experience, are not im-
permissibly stringent-. Id: at 218-19.
119. The Spurlock court reviewed the evidence that a person with a college
degree could better cope with the rigorous on-going training program required
of flight officers and concluded that the evidence supported the trial court's
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Where a relationship has not been or cannot be shown, the
business necessity defense fails.
The BFOQ standard is also broadened by the Harriss decision.
The court required no showing of the magnitude of the risks in-
volved or of the actual prospect that business operations would
be undermined. 2 ' More importantly, the court failed to question
whether there was a correlation between the traits which posed
the risks to passenger safety and membership in the protected
class (pregnant women) sufficient to justify intentional
discrimination. 2' Underlying this failure was the court's implicit
acceptance of the premise that pregnancy is a unique, objectively
identifiable condition which is incomparable to any other physical
finding that United's college degree requirement was job-related. 475 F.2d at
219. Cf. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 82, 101 & n.173
(1972) (standards of necessity under Title VII to be judicially established; Con-
gress intended subordination of managerial prerogative with respect to racial
discrimination).
120. Were these given more attention by the court, the question whether
Pan Am's policies were merely a pretext for discrimination clearly would have
been raised. The district court, inquiring into the origin of the policies, found
that the specific considerations which entered into their adoption were
unknown. Pan Am's medical department had proposed the start and stop times,
but no one knew of any studies, deliberations or specific considerations which
underlay the policies. None of the witnesses testifying on this issue were able
to discuss its merits or alternatives that might have been considered. 437 F.
Supp. at 416. Moreover, prior to the time the Stop and Start Policies were in-
itiated, Pan Am's policy was to terminate any flight attendant who became
pregnant. Pan Am also retained, at that time, the option to terminate female
flight attendants after six months of marriage. Id. at 415. See generally Com-
ment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1532 (1974) (ability to become pregnant has historically been significant in justi-
fying laws and practices which discriminate against women) [hereinafter cited
as The Uniqueness Trap]. Because of its deference to Pan Am's responsibility
for risk management, the Harriss court did not seriously consider the possibili-
ty of pretext.
121. See generally Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification:
Defining Title VIIs Evolving Enigma, Related Litigation Problems, and the
Judical Vision of Womanhood After Dothard v. Rawlinson, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 107, 120-27 (1974) (BFOQ not established where sex has not been shown to
be the best available index of the attribute which would pose severe and prob-
able risk to job performance and essence of business). Clearly, the risk of un-
predictable incapacitation is inherent in a wide range of physical conditions, see
649 F.2d at 679-80 (Schroeder, J., dissenting), and is not identifiable only by
reference to the pregnant condition.
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condition and so may justifiably be treated differently in the for-
mulation of employment policies. 122
In light of the explicit congressional intent to prohibit the use
of pregnancy or the capacity to become pregnant to perpetuate
sex discrimination in employment,12 the implications of the Har-
riss decision are unsettling. Because the capacity to become
pregnant has been used to distinguish the male from the female,
Congress now equates pregnancy distinctions with sex discrimina-
tion."' However, the 1978 amendment leaves open the possibility,
realized in Harriss, that deeply engrained stereotypes about
pregnancy and about a pregnant woman's ability to work will
continue to limit employment opportunities for women. More-
over, the Harriss court's dilution of the BFOQ defense could
allow exclusion of all pregnant women from any job that might
require greater than normal alertness or agility at some unpre-
dictable time during employment. It is only a short step to ex-
cluding all women of childbearing age from such positions,
because pregnancy itself is often upredicatable and undiscern-
ible until a certain stage.'25
To avoid these results, the EEOC guidelines on pregnancy
discrimination and application of the BFOQ exception' must be
given adequate judicial recognition. Although the Supreme Court
has regarded these administrative guidelines as authoritative, 7
122. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974); The Uniqueness
Trap, supra note 120, at 1560 (because pregnancy stereotypes can be associated
with some objective physical characteristics, they are easy to call "rational,"
although the characteristics are unrelated to the laws based on the
stereotypes). Cf. Ostrer, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: Defining the Equal Op-
portunity Rights of Pregnant Workers, 10 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 605,
615 (1979) ("[to say that pregnancy is unique is to say] that a pregnant woman is
dissimilarly situated to all men, and similarly situated to none"). It is instruc-
tive that the district court in Harriss made a finding that pregnancy is a unique
condition for which provision must be made by Pan Am. 437 F. Supp. at 436.
123. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 106.
124. Id. at 4750-51 (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
125. 4B R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 305.00 (3d ed. 1981).
126. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2, -.10 &
app. (1980).
127. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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it has occasionally deferred to them only selectively128 or has re-
jected them outright.1" These guidelines, aimed at eliminating
subterfuge, sophistry, and long-held stereotypes about pregnan-
cy, and therefore about women's rights as workers, must be en-
forced if the congressional mandate of the 1978 amendment is to
be realized and the bases for sex discrimination are to be effec-
tively eliminated.
Margaret L. Cohen
128. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977).
129. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976). But cf.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 106, at 4750 (1972 EEOC guidelines on pregnancy
discrimination, rejected by the Supreme Court in Gilbert, rightly implement the
Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination in the 1964 Civil Rights Act). See
generally Comment, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the EEOC
Guidelines: A Return to "Great Deference"'?, U. PITT. L. REV. 735 (1980).
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